Previous work demonstrated that 9-month-olds who were familiarized with 3-syllable strings consistent with both a broader (AAB or ABA) and narrower (AAdi or AdiA) generalization made only the latter. Because the narrower generalization is a subset of the broader one, any example that is consistent with the broader generalization but not the narrower one should allow a rational learner to select the broader generalization. The current experiment asked whether infants show evidence of being such learners. Infants who heard the stimuli that previously led to the narrower generalization plus three counterexamples mixed into the last five stimuli made the broader generalization at test. A control condition ruled out the possibility that infants based their generalization on the last five familiarization stimuli. The new findings suggest that infants effectively consider multiple competing models for their input and use rational decision criteria for selecting among these models.
Introduction
The past 15 years of infant language research have demonstrated that infants are able to track many linguistically relevant properties of their environment (Gómez, 2002; Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996) and to generalize beyond the specific surface properties of this input to more abstract structure (Chambers, Onishi, & Fisher, 2003; Gerken, 2004; Gerken & Bollt, 2008; Gómez & Gerken, 1999; Marcus, Vijayan, Rao, & Vishton, 1999; Maye, Werker, & Gerken, 2002; Saffran & Thiessen, 2003) . What is the basis for infants' ability to generalize? We can take this question to reflect a more basic question about the nature of human mind: Do learners attempt to recover from their input a model of the world that could have generated that input (i.e., a generative model) and use this model to generalize? Or is simply storing the input in the appropriate form sufficient to allow for the types of generalization we see in infant studies?
The view that learners are model builders, which is the focus of the current study, is consistent with recent Bayesian accounts of learning (e.g., Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001) , and it makes two interrelated predictions. First, because any input could logically have been produced by multiple models, a learner might entertain, at least at some point during learning, more than one possible model for their input. Second and more specifically, if models of the input are logically contradictory, a rational learner should be able to very quickly rule out the contradicted model in favor of the supported one. The experiment reported here reflects an attempt to test these two predictions.
There is a growing body of literature suggesting that infants' and children's behavior is consistent with creating and comparing generative models. For example, Xu and Tenenbaum (2007) found that children presented with a novel word labeling a single example of a basic-level category (e.g., a Dalmatian as an instance of a dog) could interpret the word as referring to either the broader category (dogs) or the narrower category (Dalmatians) consistent with that one example. In contrast, children presented with three examples of the narrower category (e.g., three different Dalmatians) treated the novel category label as
